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1. Introduction  
A large body of literature reveals that behavioral elements are important driving forces 
of acquiring firms‟ performance in mergers and acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny‟s (2003) 
market valuation theory suggests an irrational investor-rational manager framework where 
managers are rational, time the market and exploit opportunities that may arise when stock 
market is in unreasonable highs to the benefit of their shareholders. Consistent with this 
theory, empirical research shows that more acquisitions take place when stock markets are 
booming than when they are depressed (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, Rhodes-Kropf et al., 
2005). Bouwman et al. (2009) also argue that acquisitions in periods of booming stock 
markets (high valuation periods) are fundamentally different from those in periods of 
depressing stock markets (low valuation periods). 
Roll‟s (1986) hubris theory posits, on the other hand, a rational investor-irrational 
manager approach where financial markets are efficient and managers engage in acquisitions 
with an overly optimistic opinion of their ability to create value and potential synergies in a 
proposed takeover. That is, overconfident managers feel that they have the ability to identify 
hidden synergies and select good targets that others cannot. They tend to overestimate future 
returns from their investment projects or the capitalized value of their future leadership and 
therefore overbid to the detriment of their shareholders‟ wealth.1 Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
document that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in acquisitions and realize 
worse performance than non-overconfident managers.  
While the individual effects of managerial overconfidence and market valuation have 
already been examined in the literature, their interaction effect remains an open question. As 
Baker et al. (2007, p. 48) argue, “the irrational manager and irrational investor stories can 
                                                 
1
 Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Billett and Qian (2008) tested the self-attribution bias as a source of 
overconfidence. They defined managers infected by self-attribution firms that make many acquisitions in a very 
short span of time. They provided evidence that self-attribution drives overconfidence showing a monotonic 
decline in bidders‟ returns by deal order. 
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certainly coexist”. Our paper attempts to reconcile these two stories of irrational managers 
and irrational investors, providing evidence about the role of managerial overconfidence in 
high and low market valuation periods and the effect to bidders‟ shareholders wealth.  
Rosen (2006) argues that managers may be infected with the same optimism as 
investors during bullish periods. If this is the case, then managers might overestimate the 
potential synergies from the merger, which is likely to influence negatively the quality of the 
deal during a hot period. On the contrary, given that high-valuation periods are associated 
with increase in bidder returns, non-overconfident managers, who assess a deal relatively 
more carefully and negotiate more efficiently may time the announcement of bids and 
enhance shareholders‟ wealth. Further, when overconfident bidders conduct deals in 
depressing markets, it is unlikely they are able to hide the quality of the deal and the possible 
overpayment. Investors in low valuation markets are substantially more careful in assessing 
the future prospects of the deal and therefore are likely to react more unfavourably when 
realizing that the deal is bad, depreciating bidder‟s stock price. Given the above, we predict 
that bidders are more likely to gain the most (least) when they are run by non-overconfident 
(overconfident) managers and the deal takes place in boom (bear) markets. 
Using a sample of UK acquisitions in the period 1990-2005, we document evidence 
that the interaction between market valuation and different behavioral traits of managers is a 
key determinant of bidders‟ announcement returns. We use a sample of 848 UK mergers and 
acquisitions between 1990 and 2005 to examine the interaction between market valuation and 
managerial overconfidence. We select to study the U.K. because it has the most active 
takeover market after the U.S. and represents more than 65% of merger transactions in 
Europe. Our results provide evidence of interaction between managerial and aggregate 
market valuations in shaping acquirers‟ returns. More specifically, the difference in 
acquisition performance between the portfolios of acquisitions by non-overconfident 
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managers in high valuation periods and overconfident managers in low valuation periods is 
an economically and statistically significant 3.05% over the five-day period surrounding the 
announcement. In addition, bidders with non-overconfident managers appear to gain the most 
in high valuation periods, while firms are better off without overconfident managers in all 
types of market conditions. Our results are robust to a multivariate analysis that controls for 
factors known to affect acquiring firms‟ returns, like the method of payment, the listing status 
of the target firm, and the size and book-to-market ratio of the acquiring firms.  
We also assess bidder returns in the long run. We do not find evidence that acquisitions 
in high and low-valuation periods generate abnormal returns in the post-event period. 
However, we find that acquisitions by overconfident bidders continue to perform worse than 
acquisitions by non-overconfident bidders in the long-term.  
The study has several contributions. First, it provides evidence that the interrelation of 
market valuation periods and managers with different traits of behaviour is an important 
factor in shaping acquiring firm‟s returns. While the individual effect of managerial 
overconfidence has already been examined in the literature, how this effect varies with the 
stock market conditions has been largely neglected. Second, in contrast to overconfident 
managers, our results indicate that non-overconfident managers are able to create value to 
their shareholders through acquisitions in all market valuation periods. Third, it is reported 
that bidders have on average worse performance when managed by managers with 
overconfidence traits in all market conditions. Fourth, it provides evidence that the effect of 
managerial overconfidence is robust outside the US and not sensitive to the quantitative 
measure of overconfidence.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the 
classification of market valuation periods and measure of overconfidence and presents the 
testable predictions. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology. Section 4 
4 
 
presents and interprets results for the short-run analysis. Section 5 presents the long-run 
results. Section 6 develops a discussion and implications of the paper. Finally, Section 7 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Classification of market valuation periods and measure of managerial overconfidence 
 
2.1    Classification of market valuation periods 
In order to examine acquisitions made in high and low valuation periods, we first need 
to identify these valuation periods in our sample period. Following Bouwman et al. (2009), 
we classify each calendar month into high-, neutral-, or low-valuation month on the basis of 
the detrended market price to earnings (P/E) ratio of the value-weighted market index. The 
market P/E ratio is detrended by removing the best straight line fit (OLS) from the P/E ratio 
of the month in question and the five preceding years.  
We then classify months into an above (below) average group if their detrended index 
P/E is above (below) the past five-year average, and subsequently rank them in descending 
order of the detrended P/E. Finally, we categorise months that belong to the top half of the 
above average group as high-valuation periods, and those that belong to the bottom half of 
the below average group as low-valuation periods. All remaining months are neutral-
valuation periods. Hence, we conclude with 56 high-valuation, 40 low-valuation and 96 
neutral-valuation months, respectively.
 2
  
 
2.2   Measure of managerial overconfidence 
To capture overconfidence, we classify managers as overconfident or non-
overconfident based on managers‟ decisions concerning their executive stock options 
                                                 
2
 To test for the robustness of results to this categorization, the detrended market index level instead of the 
detrended market P/E ratio was also used and the results obtained are qualitatively similar but are not presented 
for space purposes. 
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(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). CEOs normally receive huge grants of stock and non-tradable 
options as part of their compensation plan. Carpenter (1998) and Hall and Murphy (2002), 
argue that risk averse CEOs should exercise their stock options before expiration if they are 
sufficient in the money since they are exposed to enormous firm-specific risk which cannot 
be diversified away. Upon exercise, the managers receive shares of company stock which are 
almost always immediately sold (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). According to Malmendier and 
Tate (2008), managers are classified as overconfident when they maintain their stock options 
until the expiration date and, hence, are exposed to high levels of risk under the belief that 
their company‟s stock will perform continuously better as an outcome of their leadership. 
We firstly identify the CEOs of our sample firms around the announcement date.
3
 After 
creating a name list of the CEOs, we search for the date the stock option was granted to the 
managers, the date that they can start exercising the option, the expiration date of the option 
and the strike price. In most cases, executive options in the U.K. have a life span of ten years 
with a vesting period of three years (i.e. they are exercisable three years after the period they 
were granted). Hence, we classify managers that hold their options until the last year before 
the expiration date as overconfident; all others are non-overconfident.
4
  
 
2.3 Testable Predictions 
The market valuation theory posits that, when stocks are overvalued, managers are 
likely to engage in acquisitions, especially share deals, by using their overvalued stocks to 
acquire less-overvalued companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Hence, more bids should 
                                                 
3
 We first search for the name of company‟s CEO around the announcement date. If there is no such post we 
identify the managing director (In the UK market, the post for the CEO was defined as managing director before 
1995). If the company does not report any of those positions we then use managers with the position of 
chairman. The percentages of CEOs, managing directors and chairmen in the sample are 83.56%, 11.12%, and 
5.32%, respectively. 
4
 We also check whether bidder‟s stock price is higher than the strike price. If a manager holds the options until 
the expiration because he is unable to exercise the option when the strike price is higher than the stock price, 
then he is not classified as overconfident but as rational. In our sample this is true in 29 deals. 
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take place during stock market booms when investors, as a group, become overoptimistic and 
drive stock prices higher than their fundamental value. During the period of high market 
valuation caused by investor‟s optimism, the market reaction to a bid announcement should 
be more favorable than to bids announced at other times (Bouwman et al. 2009). Thus, we 
expect that acquirers during high-valuation markets earn substantially higher returns than 
those conducting deals in low-valuation periods. 
Roll (1986) was the first to study the behavioral element of overconfidence in an M&A 
context. In this framework, managers may overestimate the synergy gains of the potential 
merger either because they believe that they have above average abilities or from the 
underestimation of the downside of the merger due to the illusion of control over its outcome 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). The managers of bidding firms that experienced recent success 
may believe that they can create value from acquisitions (Billett and Qian, 2008). However, 
overconfidence may lead managers to undertake bad acquisitions. Hence, we should expect 
that overconfident managers should experience lower returns in their acquisitions. 
Rosen (2006) argues that managers are likely to have the same optimism as investors 
during bullish periods. Hence, managers might overestimate the potential synergies from the 
merger, which is likely to influence the quality of the deal during a hot period. If managers 
are rewarded for increasing stock prices, then they have an incentive to make acquisitions in 
hot markets, since even a bad deal is likely to temporarily increase acquirer‟s stock price. 
Given that during high-valuation periods there is potential for value-creation in M&As even 
for overconfident managers, non-overconfident managers may time the announcement of bids 
and enhance shareholders‟ wealth. On the other hand, when overconfident bidders conduct 
deals in depressing markets, it is extremely unlikely to hide the quality of the deal and the 
possible overpayment. Investors in low valuation markets are substantially more careful in 
assessing the future prospects of the deal and therefore they are likely to react even more 
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unfavourably when realizing that the deal is bad, depreciating bidder‟s stock price. Given the 
above, we should expect that bidders should gain (lose) the most when they are run by non-
overconfident (overconfident) managers and the deal takes place in boom (bear) markets. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 The sample 
The initial sample consists of 3223 mergers and acquisitions announced by 1281 U.K. 
unique bidders for the period between 1990 and 2005, collected from the Security Data 
Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We require that the acquirer is a 
U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and has five days of return 
data around the acquisition announcement date. The target company is either listed or 
unlisted company and domestic or foreign firm.
5
 To be included in the sample, the acquirer 
owns less than 10% of the target company‟s stock before the bid announcement and more 
than 50% after the deal. Further, the deal value should be £1 million or above and the deal 
value should represent at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer. 
In addition to these criteria, we require that stock options data for bidding firms‟ 
managers are available. Stock options data are obtained through the annual reports of the 
companies by using Lexis-Nexis database for the period 1990 to 1999-2000 and Northcote 
Internet for the period 1999-2000 to 2005.
6
 If not available on Lexis-Nexis or Northcote 
Internet, we directly requested companies themselves to provide their annual reports. Our 
final sample consists of 848 acquisitions, where 601 (70%) deals were conducted by non-
overconfident managers and 247 (30%) by overconfident managers. 
Looking at the Table 1 we observe an increased merger activity in the late 1990s, when 
the market was in a booming period, consistent with the literature which provides evidence of 
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 We do not include subsidiary firms in the analysis. 
6
 Northcote Internet is a free online research tool which links you to listed company information. It provides 
company information including Financial Reports, Webcasts & Press Releases (www.northcote.co.uk).  
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high correlation between merger activity and market valuation (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2001).  
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 displays the activity of acquisitions among public and private targets, mean and 
median value of acquirer and the value of deals stratified by the deal value for the different 
market valuation periods and types of investors (i.e. overconfident versus non-overconfident). 
The acquirer‟s market capitalization equals the price per share one-month prior to the bid 
announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. The target‟s firm size is 
measured as the deal value of the bid at the announcement. For the entire sample, the mean 
(median) size of the acquirer is £638.33 million (£154.29 million) for 303 unique acquirers, 
while for targets, the mean (median) size, measured as transaction value, is £59.24 million 
(£8.32 million). An interesting observation that emerges from the sample is that private firms 
comprise the vast majority of targets (722 or 85%) in contrast to the small number of publicly 
traded targets (126 or 15%).
7
 The mean value of acquirers in public acquisition is by far 
larger than the mean value of bidders in private acquisitions (slightly less than five times the 
market capitalization). In deal value terms, public targets exhibit a disproportional percentage 
of total deal value (68%) when considering their small contribution to the total number of 
acquisitions (15%). In fact, public firms are by far larger than private firms (the average 
transaction value of public firms equals to £274 million versus £21 million for private firms).  
Looking at the summary statistics by market valuation periods, 248 acquisitions were 
announced during high-valuation periods, 400 during neutral-valuation periods and 200 
during low-valuation periods. Thus, consistent with previous literature, we have more deals 
                                                 
7
 This is in line with Doukas and Petmezas (2007) who report that 91% of their UK M&A sample between 1980 
and 2004 includes privately held acquisitions. 
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in booming markets (29.35%) than in low-valuation periods (23.58%).
8
  With respect to the 
deal value, despite the inflated deal values, the percentage of total deal value in high 
valuation months (26.35%) is only slightly higher than that in low valuation months 
(23.05%).  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
3.2 Methodology 
Bidder returns surrounding the acquisition announcement are examined using the well-
known event study methodology. The conventional event study method (Brown and Warner, 
1985) requires an estimation period that is free from the event under analysis to estimate 
unbiased parameters for the estimation of benchmark returns. Since about 30% of the 
acquiring firms in our sample engage in multiple acquisitions within 200 days, previous 
announcements would be included in the estimation period and therefore market parameter 
estimations would be, to an extent, biased. Hence, to overcome this problem, we estimate 
market adjusted CARs for a 5-day (-2, +2) window surrounding the event using equation (1): 
2
2
(1) it it mt
t
AR R R

   
where itR  is the return on firm i and mtR  is the value-weighed market index return. The FT-
All Share Market Index is used to estimate the market return. For similar reasons, Fuller et al. 
(2002), Faccio et al. (2006), and Bouwman et al. (2009), among others, also use similar 
approach. 
To examine the long-run abnormal stock returns following an acquisition, we use two 
different approaches. The first approach is the traditional buy-and-hold-abnormal-return 
(BHAR) approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997). We calculate the abnormal return 
                                                 
8
 However, it is worth noticing that we cannot draw strong inferences from the number of acquisitions in high 
valuation periods and low valuations periods because of the sample selection criteria adopted in this paper. We 
are not investigating all deals that took place in the 1990-2005, but just a subsample.  
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as the acquiring firm‟s BHAR less the BHAR of a control firm over the three years following 
the acquisition announcement:  
                               
 
   
 
   
 
where Rit is the monthly return for firm i; Rcit is the monthly return of the control firm 
assigned to sample firm i; t represents the 36-month after the acquisition. Following Barber 
and Lyon (1997), we match a sample firm to a control firm of similar size and book-to-
market ratio. The matching procedure is as follows. First, we identify all firms with a market 
value of equity between 70% and 130% of the market value of equity of the sample firm. 
Second, from this set of firms, we select the firm with a book-to-market ratio which is closest 
to that of the sample firm.
9
 To calculate statistical significance, we follow Lyon et al. (1999) 
and adopt a skewness-adjusted t-statistics. 
Our second measure of long-run abnormal returns is the Calendar Time Abnormal 
Return (CTAR), which controls for the problem of cross-sectional dependence of sample 
observations as suggested by Lyon et al. (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000).  
          (3)   CTARi,t=Rit   Rcpi,t                                                         
 
where Rit is the monthly return for each security, and Rcpi,t is the return of the event control 
portfolio assigned to each sample firm based on size and book-to-market ratio.
10
 In each 
calendar month t, a portfolio is formed by including all stocks with an acquisition event 
during the past 36 months. Every month the portfolio is rebalanced by including new event 
firms that made a deal in the previous month and disregard those that have completed three 
                                                 
9
 There were just two cases where we needed to expand the size filter.  
10
 As in Fama and French (1993) we form 25 portfolios. In June of each year t we sort all qualifying UK stocks 
listed on Datastream criteria according to their market capitalization to form 5 portfolios. Independently, we also 
sort all stocks according to their book-to-market ratios in December of year t−1, and form five portfolios. We 
calculate the returns of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios that are rebalanced yearly. We then assign 
each sample firm a control portfolio (comprising any of non-merging firms within the preceding or subsequent 3 
years) based on its market capitalization and book-to-market from July of year t to June of year t+1.  
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years in the calendar approach. For each calendar month t we calculate a mean return 
________
( )tCTAR  across the firms:  
                                                       (4) 
________
,
1
1t
N
t i t
i t
CTAR CTAR
N
                                                         
where tN  is the number of firms in the calendar-time month t. We then calculate a grand 
mean monthly abnormal return, the (MCTAR):  
                                                      (5) 
_______
1
(1/ )
T
t
t
MCTAR T CTAR

                                                          
where T is the total number of calendar months. To calculate statistical significance, we adopt 
the approach of Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and standardise the monthly CTARs by 
estimates of the portfolio standard deviation. Statistical significance is calculated by using the 
time-series standard deviation of the mean monthly abnormal returns. 
 
4. Short-run results 
4.1 Announcement returns of acquirers 
We first attempt to confirm that market valuation and managerial overconfidence are 
important individual factors in explaining bidder returns. According to the literature, high 
valuation bidders outperform low valuation bidders and non-overconfident bidders generate 
larger returns than overconfident bidders. We then test whether interaction of market 
valuation with managerial overconfidence drives bidder returns. Table 3, Panel A, reports the 
announcement returns (5-day CARs) for the full sample and for sub-samples based on market 
valuation periods (high, neutral, low). The empirical evidence reveals that on average 
acquirer‟s shareholders gain a significantly positive return (0.94%) at the bid announcement. 
The market valuation theory suggests that high-valuation acquirers outperform low-valuation 
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acquirers in the short-run. Consistent with Bouwman et al. (2009) and our prediction, the 
market reaction to acquisition deals undertaken during bullish periods is significantly positive 
(1.21%) and outperforms low-valuation deals (0.34%) by an economically (but not 
statistically) significant margin (0.87%).  
Panel B of Table 3 compares the abnormal returns earned by overconfident bidders to 
the returns generated by non-overconfident bidders. The overconfidence bias suggests that 
managerial overconfidence should be associated with lower wealth effects than those 
generated by non-overconfident acquirers. Table 3 confirms that the market reaction to 
acquisition deals made by overconfident and non-overconfident managers is considerably 
different. For non-overconfident acquirers the mean acquirer abnormal return is 1.26%, 
significantly different from zero. For overconfident acquirers we find that the mean acquirer 
abnormal return over the five-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement date is 
0.16% and statistically insignificant. The mean difference in abnormal returns between non-
overconfident and overconfident is 1.10% and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that overconfident acquirers fail to outperform non-overconfident acquirers as 
predicted. This evidence supports the theoretical prediction of Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
who posit that overconfident managers overestimate their ability to generate superior returns.  
Finally, we interact market valuation and managerial overconfidence. In fact, so far we 
have established previous findings that high valuation acquirers outperform on average low-
valuation acquirers and acquisitions by non-overconfident managers exhibit significantly 
better performance than those by overconfident managers. An important point is to 
understand whether managerial overconfidence interacts with market conditions in 
determining bidders‟ announcement returns. Panel C of Table 3 shows that acquisitions by 
non-overconfident managers gain the most, irrespective of aggregate market conditions.  Bids 
announced during high stock market valuation by non-overconfident managers gain a 
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statistically significant excess return of 1.36%, while acquisitions by overconfident managers 
generate insignificant abnormal returns. Their mean difference is also insignificant. The 
pattern is similar in periods of neutral valuations: higher returns are obtained for non-
overconfident bidders relative to overconfident bidders, but their mean difference (0.64%) is 
not statistically significant. However, in periods of low stock market valuation, overconfident 
and non-overconfident managers exhibit a sharply different pattern. While non-overconfident 
managers are still able to generate a positive CAR (1.13%), the abnormal return for 
overconfident acquirers is on average negative (-1.69%). The difference in the short-term 
acquisition performance in low valuation period (2.82%) is statistically significant. This 
indicates that the impact of overconfidence is particularly relevant in low stock market 
valuation periods, as expected. While boom markets may hide managers‟ mistakes and/or 
overpayments, this veil falls when the overall stock market declines.  
It is also important to notice that the performance of non-overconfident acquirers is not 
sensitive to the overall stock market conditions. The return difference between the 
performance in high valuation periods and the performance in low valuation periods is a 
negligible 24 basis points. The acquisition performance of overconfident managers seems to 
be correlated with the stock market cycle. In fact, the difference between high and low 
periods is a statistically significant 2.51% over the 5-day period surrounding the 
announcement. This suggests that when overconfident bidders conduct deals in low-valuation 
markets, they cannot conceal the quality of the deal and the possible overpayment because 
investors in those markets are more cautious when assessing the potential synergies and 
future growth prospects of the acquisition. However, in hot markets the widespread investors‟ 
optimism allows overconfident managers to avoid price depreciation of their stocks. When 
we compare acquisition performance of the two extreme portfolios, i.e., non-overconfident 
managers in high-valuation periods and overconfident managers in low-valuation periods, we 
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interestingly obtain a significant return differential of 3.05%. This result supports our 
prediction and shows that the interaction of overconfidence biases by managers and overall 
stock market valuation is an important driver of acquiring firm‟s announcement returns.  
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
The M&A literature has documented a number of different factors that affect the 
performance of bidding firms surrounding the event, such as book-to-market (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998), size (Moeller et al., 2004) relative size (Fuller et al., 2002) and industry 
diversification (Doukas and Kan, 2004).  
The results generated so far by employing a univariate type of analysis signify that 
overconfident bidders realize considerably lower announcement returns than non-
overconfident acquirers, especially during low stock market valuation period. To better 
examine whether differences in acquirer and deal characteristics explain the abnormal return 
differentials we adopt a multivariate regression framework where announcement period 
returns to bidders are regressed against a set of explanatory variables that have been proved 
in the literature to affect bidders‟ performance.  
In all regressions we include the following control variables: a dummy that takes the 
value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; a dummy that takes the value of one if 
the acquisition is stock- (cash-) financed and zero otherwise. To control for the bidder‟s size 
effect, we introduce the log of the bidder‟s stock market capitalization a month before the 
deal‟s announcement. Other variables included in the regression are the following: the 
bidder‟s book-to-market value, which is measured by the bidder‟s net book value of assets 
divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; the deal‟s relative 
size, which is measured as the ratio of the deal value over the bidder‟s value;  a dummy 
variable for diversifying deals which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‟s two-digit SIC 
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code is different from that of the target, and zero otherwise. A merger activity dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A 
period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A 
statistics from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorized as an active 
period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other 
explanatory variables include: the acquirer‟s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the 
bid‟s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day 
period prior to the announcement.  
Table 4 presents the results. In regression (1), we include dummies for acquisitions in 
low and high valuation periods. Consistent to the literature (for instance, Bouwman et al., 
2009), once we control for factors affecting returns, the coefficient of the high market 
valuation dummy is positive and significant. Regression (1) also shows that the acquirer‟s 
lagged excess return exhibits a positive relationship with bidder‟s announcement returns. On 
the other hand, also consistent with prior literature, stock deals, and bidder‟s size negatively 
impact the acquiring firm‟s abnormal returns. 
 In the next regression (2), we regress the acquisition CARs on the dummy for 
overconfident managers and the set of control variables. As expected from the univariate 
analysis, the coefficient is negative and significant, documenting that overconfident managers 
do worse acquisitions than non-overconfident ones. For the control variables, results are 
similar to regression (1) with the exception of the positive coefficient for the private 
acquisitions dummy, which turns to be marginally significant. 
Finally in regressions (3) and (4), we include interaction variables between 
overconfidence and stock market valuation. In regression (3), the vector of explanatory 
variables includes dummy variables to capture for bids announced by bidders with non-
overconfident (overconfident) managers at the time of high (low) market valuation to allow 
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for interaction between managerial overconfidence and aggregate market performance. The 
dummy for high valuation/non-overconfident managers is positive and significant, which 
indicates that non-overconfident managers are able to exploit favorable market conditions to 
close out deals that, at least in the short-term, improve the firm‟s stock price. On the other 
hand, the dummy variable for deals made by overconfident managers in low acquisition 
periods does not have a negative relationship with the announcement returns in regressions 
(3) and (4), as expected from the univariate analysis. Results for controlling variables are 
identical to previous regressions, apart from the market return variable that is no longer 
significant in the last two regressions.  
Overall, the evidence reaffirms that bidder‟s announcement period gains depend jointly 
on aggregate stock market valuation conditions and managerial overconfidence. This finding 
does not alter even after controlling for the possible implications of other bid‟s features, such 
as target status, methods of payment, bidder‟s growth opportunities, corporate focus and 
M&A activity. Evidence from both univariate and multivariate analyses provides support that 
bidders infected by managerial overconfidence experience lower announcement period‟s 
returns. Consistent to the univariate results, multivariate analysis confirms that non-
overconfident managers may time the market and engage in merger deals during high-
valuation periods increasing shareholders‟ wealth considerably.  
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1. Private acquisitions 
We have mentioned earlier that our sample is mainly composed of acquisitions of non-
publicly listed firms (approximately 85% of the total sample). In this section, we analyze 
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separately the sample of private acquisitions to investigate whether the inclusion of 
acquisitions of public companies affects our results.  
Table 5, Panel A, reports the univariate results for the sample of 722 acquisitions of 
private firms. Overall bidders gain a positive and significant CAR (1.37%). This result is 
consistent with previous literature. Chang (1998), and Draper and Paudyal (2006), among 
others, show that bidders enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns (especially with 
stock-swaps) around the announcement of acquisitions of private companies, which is 
explained by the limited competition, the monitoring and the information hypotheses, 
respectively. Acquirers that conduct deals during high market valuation periods gain on 
average more (1.66%) than acquirers in low valuation periods (0.84%).  
Panel B examines acquisition performance of firms with overconfident managers and 
non-overconfident managers. Consistent to the full sample results, overconfident managers 
exhibit inferior performance (0.72%) relative to their non-overconfident counterparts 
(1.61%). The difference is statistically significant.  
Most importantly, Panel C also confirms the interaction results presented in Table 3. 
While overconfidence does not have a significant impact in high- and neutral-valuation 
periods, in low-valuation periods, overconfident managers do not obtain the same 
performance as non-overconfident managers. In particular, non-overconfident managers 
enjoy a profit of 1.41% over the 5-day event period, while overconfident bidders generate an 
insignificant -0.78% over the same period. Their mean difference equals to 2.19% and is 
statistically significant. 
Panel D presents the multivariate regression analysis for the private firms‟ subsample. 
Results are similar to those presented in Table 4 in the first two regressions. Managerial 
overconfidence remains negatively related to the short-run performance of bidders acquiring 
a private company, even after we control for factors known to affect acquisition returns 
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(regression 2). Regressions (3) and (4) confirm the event studies‟ tests that overconfidence 
leads to worse acquisitions in low valuation periods when we restrict the sample to 
acquisitions of private companies. More specifically, the low valuation-overconfident 
variable carries a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level, which signifies 
that managerial overconfidence is more detrimental to firm‟s shareholders in periods of 
depressed stock market prices. 
 
4.3.2 Multiple acquirer proxy 
While the overconfidence measure based on stock options is the most commonly 
accepted proxy of managerial overconfidence, it has a drawback in our sample. In particular, 
we are not able to classify a large fraction of managers because of data limitations. To 
address the concern that there is no sample selection bias, we check for the robustness of our 
results using another commonly used proxy of managerial overconfident: multiple 
acquisitions.  
Fuller et al. (2002) define multiple acquirers as firms that make five or more 
acquisitions within a 3-year period. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) use the same definition to 
define multiple acquirers and argue that they are infected by overconfidence which is rooted 
from self-attribution bias and which in turn leads to lower wealth effects than those generated 
by rational bidders. In this study, we adopt a similar approach with one very important, 
however, differentiation: to classify firms as multiple or single bidders, we do not refer to 
companies but to managers themselves. Therefore, managers who perform multiple 
acquisitions (5 or more) in a small period of time (3 years) are defined as overconfident. 
Since we focus on managerial overconfidence, it would be more reliable to adopt this proxy 
from the perspective of the CEO him/herself. A company may have contacted 5 or more 
acquisitions in a 3-year period of time, but in the meantime different individuals (CEOs) 
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might have taken the decisions for those projects. In total, we obtained data for 3099 deals,
11
 
a much larger sample to 848 deals with stock options data. We find that 2256 (72%) 
acquisitions were conducted by non-overconfident managers and 843 (27%) by overconfident 
managers. Despite being larger, the average deal value in this sample is 66.29 million, 
remarkably similar to the 59.24 million documented in Table 1 for the stock-options sample. 
In sum, the summary statistics for overconfident and non-overconfident bidders are 
qualitatively similar for both proxies, a fact that enhances the representativeness and 
robustness of the sub-samples used in the empirical analysis for the two different measures of 
overconfidence.
12
 
Tables 6 and 7 present the univariate and multivariate results respectively when using 
the multiple acquirer proxy. The univariate tests in Table 6 confirm the results obtained with 
stock options proxy that overconfident managers generate significant lower announcement 
returns (0.88%) than non-overconfident bidders (1.65%). Their mean difference in the event 
window (-2, +2) is a positive CAR of 0.77% and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Similarly to the stock option based proxy, non-overconfident bidders earn larger returns both 
in high and low valuation markets, but the difference is statistically significant only in high 
valuation markets (0.94%). Finally, the mean difference between the two extreme portfolios 
of deals undertaken by non-overconfident managers in high-valuation markets and those 
conducted by overconfident managers in low-valuation markets is 1.97% and significant at 
the 1% level. Finally, Table 7 reports the cross-sectional results, which are akin to those 
reported in Table 4 for the stock-option sample. This indicates that the relationship between 
bidder returns and overconfident managers in high and low markets is robust even after using 
a larger sample and different proxy of managerial overconfidence.  
[Insert Tables 6 & 7 About Here] 
                                                 
11
 In total, we obtained data for 3099 deals (96 % of the initial sample) given that for 124 deals the names of 
bidders‟ managers were not provided by the database. 
12
 We omit the descriptive table of the larger sample. The table is available from the authors upon request.  
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5. Long run returns of acquirers  
So far we have shown the results around the announcement date where acquisitions 
conducted by non-overconfident bidders are value-increasing and lead to better performance 
than those initiated by overconfident bidders irrespective of the valuation period. In addition, 
non-overconfident bidders generate their largest returns in bullish periods. However, initial 
market reactions are not always consistent to long term results. Hence, to address this issue, 
we examine post-event bidder returns. 
Table 8 presents the results. Panel A shows the results for BHAR analysis and Panel B 
for CTAR analysis, respectively. In contrast with announcement returns, overall, bidders lose 
on average -4.23% over the 36-month post-event period, but this result is not statistically 
significant. Acquisitions undertaken by overconfident bidders are associated with a 
statistically significant -21.75%, consistent with previous literature (Doukas and Petmezas, 
2007), while acquisitions by non-overconfident bidders generate an average BHAR of 2.98%, 
but statistically insignificant. We find that the difference is equal with 24.73% and 
statistically significant at conventional level. We do not find any evidence of significant 
abnormal returns when examining the long-term performance of acquiring firms by market 
valuation periods.  
When examining bidder post-event returns for the interrelationship between managerial 
overconfidence and market valuation, we find that during neutral periods, acquisitions 
undertaken by overconfident bidders destroy shareholders wealth by a significant 36-month 
BHAR of -38.23%, while acquisitions undertaken by non-overconfident bidders are value 
increasing over the 3-year post-event period (17.92%). Overall, the results are, in general, 
consistent when using the CTAR approach to measure long-term returns. In unreported 
results, we performed multivariate regression analysis using the same explanatory variables 
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as in Tables 5 and 7. Consistent with univariate analysis, we do not find a significant role for 
market valuation in the long-term. 
 [Insert Table 8 About Here] 
 
6. Discussion and implications 
The results presented above have important implications regarding firms‟ compensation 
practices, corporate governance mechanisms, and market timing. First, managerial 
overconfidence implies that, in contrast with agency theory and managers‟ empire incentives, 
CEOs believe that their actions will increase shareholders‟ value, however their excessive 
optimism leads them to overpay with negative and harmful consequences to their own 
shareholders. Second, as a consequence of the first implication, even if there are contractual 
agreements which tie managers‟ compensation to firm performance, it is still uncertain 
whether they will cancel their value-destroying corporate actions, sourced from a behavioral 
bias. Hence, corporate governance mechanisms should be implemented to monitor CEOs‟ 
decisions. This is due to the fact that firms cannot rely only on stock options and stock grants 
to align CEOs and shareholders‟ interests, as this does not guarantee that the CEO will take a 
value-improvement decision if he is affected by overconfidence. Third, recently the 
importance of independent directors has been brought into surface in the US, after 2002, with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and in the UK, after 1992, with the Cadbury Committee 
Recommendations. The results of our study suggest that the presence of more independent 
directors in firms‟ Board could prove desirable in order to effectively monitor CEOs 
decisions, mitigating potential overconfidence when undertaking relatively optimistic 
projects. Fourth, our results imply that firms are better off when selecting non-overconfident 
bidders, which indicates that firms should be cautious during the process of CEOs 
appointment. Finally, our results imply that the timing of the acquisition plays a role in 
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explaining bidders‟ performance. This is an indication that managers can exploit certain 
period in improving shareholders‟ wealth. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Several decades of intense research has generated a number of theories that attempt to 
explain the observed pattern of bidder‟s gains. However, none of these theories has fully 
explained the empirical (ir)regularities found on the wealth effects of takeovers. In this study 
we examine how the interaction between stock market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence affects bidder returns. We classify our sample period in different stock 
market valuation periods (high, neutral, and low) to study differences between deals 
undertaken by overconfident and deals carried out by non-overconfident managers. The 
evidence presented in the paper suggests the joint significance of aggregate market condition 
and managerial (non-)overconfidence in shaping the gains to acquirers. The main finding 
indicates that non-overconfident managers realize their largest returns in high valuation 
periods. In addition, non-overconfident bidders are able to enhance shareholders‟ wealth 
through M&A deals and outperform overconfident bidders in all valuation periods. This 
outperformance of non-overconfident bidders relative to overconfident bidders, on average, 
holds also in the long run. 
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics of Acquisitions by Year.  
  Bidder Type Valuation Periods 
Year All Non-Overconfident Overconfident High Neutral Low 
1990 18 8 10 0 18 0 
1991 20 14 6 19 1 0 
1992 23 14 9 13 10 0 
1993 29 19 10 6 23 0 
1994 52 35 17 0 24 28 
1995 47 31 16 0 25 22 
1996 56 41 15 0 56 0 
1997 76 49 27 49 27 0 
1998 77 58 19 61 16 0 
1999 88 64 24 76 12 0 
2000 98 64 34 0 71 27 
2001 73 50 23 0 0 73 
2002 60 51 9 0 22 38 
2003 43 31 12 3 28 12 
2004 52 44 8 18 34 0 
2005 36 28 8 3 33 0 
TOTAL 848 601 247 248 400 200 
 
Note: The table presents the number of acquisitions by year and the percentage of total number of acquisitions by bidder type (non-overconfident versus overconfident) and 
market valuation periods (high, neutral, low). The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 848 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005 undertaken by 303 unique 
bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Targets include 
both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Overconfident and non-overconfident managers are classified based on a stock option measure: Managers who hold 
stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as non-overconfident.  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Acquisitions by the Stock Options Proxy for High- and Low-Valuation Periods. 
Type of 
Acquisition 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Market 
Equity (£ mil) 
Median 
Market Equity 
(£ mil) 
Mean 
Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Median 
Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Total Deal 
Value (£ mil) 
% of Total 
Deal Value 
% of Total 
Number of 
acquisitions 
All Deals 848 638.333 154.29 59.237 8.32 50232.569 100.00 100.00 
Non-overconfident 601 617.915 161.47 62.349 8.28 37471.761 74.60 70.87 
Overconfident 247 688.014 137.85 51.663 8.4 12760.808 25.40 29.13 
High 248 535.494 150.58 53.365 10.95 13234.612 26.35 29.25 
Low 200 724.116 211.78 57.806 9.53 11561.319 23.02 23.58 
All Private Deals 722 409.887 147.13 21.677 6.16 15651.123 31.16 85.14 
Non-overconfident 522 386.482 154.69 22.415 6.5 11700.672 74.76 61.56 
Overconfident 200 470.974 111.73 19.752 5.70 3950.451 25.24 23.58 
High 205 385.178 137.85 24.015 6.16 4923.098 31.46 24.17 
Low 174 510.154 193.07 22.061 8.16 3838.611 24.53 20.52 
All Public Deals 126 1947.363 362.99 274.456 81.12 34581.446 68.84 14.86 
Non-overconfident 79 2147.128 362.92 326.216 79 25771.089 74.52 9.32 
Overconfident 47 1611.588 363.06 187.454 87.11 8810.357 25.48 5.54 
High 43 1252.120 362.92 193.291 77.13 8311.514 24.03 5.07 
Low 26 2156.019 626.25 297.027 117.93 7722.708 22.33 3.07 
 
Note: The table presents the number of acquisitions, the mean and median market value of acquirers and the mean and median values of targets. The last three columns list 
the total deal value and the percentage of total value of transaction and number of acquisitions, respectively. The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 
3223 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005 undertaken by 303 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include 
both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended 
market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfident and non-overconfident managers 
are classified based on a stock option measure: Managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are 
classified as non-overconfident. The acquirer‟s market capitalization equals the price per share one-month prior to the bid announcement times the number of common 
shares outstanding. The target‟s firm size is measured as the deal value of the bid. 
 
Table 3.  Announcement Returns by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and Interaction of 
Both with Stock Options Proxy. 
 
 
Panel A: Market valuation 
 All Bidders High Neutral Low Differential 
CARs (-2,+2) 0.94
a 
1.21
a 
1.07
a 
0.34
 
0.87 
N 848 248 400 200 [0.161] 
Panel B: Managerial Overconfidence 
 All Bidders Non-Overconfident Overconfident Differential 
CARs (-2,+2) 0.94
a 
1.26
a 
0.16 1.10
b 
N 848 601 247 [0.031] 
Panel C: Interaction 
Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Market Valuation (4) Non-Overconfident (5) Overconfident 
(4)-(5) 
[p-value] 
(1) High  1.36
a 
0.83 0.54 
N 175 73 [0.537] 
    
(2) Neutral 1.26
a 
0.62 0.64 
N 282 118 [0.317] 
    
(3) Low  1.13
a 
-1.69 2.81
b 
N 144 56 [0.045] 
    
(1)-(3) 0.24 2.51
c
 3.05
b 
[p-value] [0.703] [0.098] [0.031] 
 
Note: This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the 
announcement by stock market valuation conditions, managerial overconfidence, and their interaction. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In panel A, using monthly data, 
each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of 
that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The 
number of bids for each category is reported below the mean return. In Panel B managers who hold stock 
options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as non-
overconfident. Panel C reports the CARs for the interaction of market valuation and managerial overconfidence. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by „a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) 
represent the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- 
minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in 
right bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- 
non-overconfident bidders minus low- overconfident bidders. N denotes the number of observations. P-values 
are reported in brackets. 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
Table 4. Cross-Sectional Analysis with Stock Options Proxy. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept 0.023 
(0.014) 
0.031
b 
(0.014) 
0.025
c 
(0.014) 
0.028
b 
(0.014) 
     
High valuation period deals 
 
0.008
c 
(0.005) 
   
     
Low valuation period deals 
 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
   
     
Overconfident deals   
 
-0.011
b 
(0.005) 
  
     
High Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals  
 
  
0.011
b 
(0.005) 
 
     
High Valuation- Overconfident Deals  
 
  
0.000 
(0.007) 
 
     
Low Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals  
 
  
0.005 
(0.007) 
 
     
Low Valuation- Overconfident Deals  
 
  
-0.014
 
(0.012) 
-0.018
 
(0.011) 
     
Private target deals 
 
0.012
 
(0.008) 
0.011
c 
(0.008) 
0.011
 
(0.008) 
0.011
 
(0.008) 
     
Cash deals 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003
 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
     
Common stock deals 
 
-0.021
b 
(0.008) 
-0.021
a 
(0.008) 
-0.021
a 
(0.008) 
-0.022
a 
(0.008) 
     
Diversifying deals 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
     
B/M 
0.008 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
     
Relative size 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
     
Log (MV) 
-0.011
a 
(0.003) 
-0.012
a 
(0.003) 
-0.011
a 
(0.003) 
-0.011
a 
(0.003) 
     
FTALLSH (-180,-3) 
0.012 
(0.024) 
0.031
c 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.018) 
     
Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 
0.018
b 
(0.008) 
0.016
c 
(0.008) 
0.017
b 
(0.008) 
0.016
c 
(0.008) 
     
High Merger Activity 
 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
     
N 822 822 822 822 
Adj. R² 5.38% 5.79% 6.11% 5.56% 
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Note: This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‟s five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial overconfidence effects and 
other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids 
announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-
valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this 
period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) 
half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year before the expiration date and 0 
otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; 
cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 
otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 
100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before 
the deal‟s announcement. Bidder‟s book-to-market is measured by the bidder‟s net book value of assets divided 
by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‟s relative size is the ratio between the 
deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 
when the acquirer‟s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero 
otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics 
Office. Each quarter is categorized as an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and 
passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‟s lagged excess return for 180 days 
prior to the bid‟s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period 
prior to the announcement. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by „a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, 
respectively. N denotes the number of observations. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
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Table 5. Acquisitions of Private Firms.   
 
Panel A: Market valuation 
 All Bidders High Neutral Low Differential 
CARs (-2,+2) 1.37
a 
1.66
a 
1.45
a 
0.84
c 
0.82
 
N 722 205 343 174 [0.170] 
Panel B: Managerial Overconfidence 
 All Bidders Non-Overconfident Overconfident Differential 
CARs (-2,+2) 1.37
a 
1.61
a 
0.72
c 
0.89
c 
N 722 522 200 [0.067] 
Panel C: Interaction 
Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Market Valuation (4) Non-Overconfident (5) Overconfident 
(4)-(5) 
[p-value] 
(1) High  1.72
a 
1.50
c 
0.22 
N 149 56 [0.810] 
    
(2) Neutral 1.66
a 
0.95
c 
0.71 
N 244 99 [0.250] 
    
(3) Low  1.41
a 
-0.78 2.19
c 
N 129 45 [0.092] 
    
(1)-(3) 0.31 2.28 2.50
c 
[p-value] [0.615] [0.116] [0.056] 
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Table 5. Acquisitions of Private Firms (Cont.) 
 
Panel D: Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept 0.033
b 
(0.016) 
0.037
b 
(0.016) 
0.034
b 
(0.016) 
0.035
b 
(0.016) 
     
High valuation period deals 0.006 
(0.005) 
   
     
Low valuation period deals -0.008 
(0.007) 
   
     
Overconfident deals  
 
 
-0.011
b 
(0.005) 
  
     
High Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals  
 
  
0.008 
(0.005) 
 
     
High Valuation- Overconfident Deals  
 
  
0.001 
(0.008) 
 
     
Low Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals  
 
  
-0.001 
(0.007) 
 
     
Low Valuation- Overconfident Deals  
 
  
-0.025
b 
(0.013) 
-0.025
b 
(0.013) 
     
Cash deals 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
     
Common stock deals 
 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
     
Diversifying deals 
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
     
B/M 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001
 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
     
Large relative size 
0.016
 
(0.032) 
0.016
 
(0.033) 
0.017
 
(0.033) 
0.018
 
(0.033) 
     
Log (MV) 
-0.009
b 
(0.004) 
-0.010
b 
(0.004) 
-0.009
b 
(0.004) 
-0.009
b 
(0.004) 
     
Rm (-180,-3) 
-0.016 
  (0.025) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
     
Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 
0.010
 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
     
High Merger Activity 
 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
     
N 702 702 702 702 
Adj. R² 2.86% 3.22% 3.80% 3.49% 
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Note: Panels A to C present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding 
the announcement of private firms‟ acquisitions by stock market valuation conditions, managerial 
overconfidence, and their interaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model 
(ARit = Rit - Rmt) where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In panel A, 
using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the 
past five-year average. The number of bids for each category is reported below the mean return. In Panel B 
managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All 
others are classified as non-overconfident. Panel C reports the CARs for the interaction of market valuation and 
managerial overconfidence. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by „a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, 
respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) represent the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around 
the acquisition announcement of high- minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident minus overconfident 
bidders respectively. The result in right bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the 
acquisition announcement of high- non-overconfident bidders minus low- overconfident bidders. P-values are 
reported in brackets. Panel D presents regression estimates of the acquirer‟s five-day cumulative abnormal 
return (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial overconfidence 
effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory variables includes dummies 
representing bids announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market 
valuation periods, high-valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month 
is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence 
deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year before 
the expiration date and 0 otherwise. Cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions 
financed with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the 
market value a month before the deal‟s announcement. Bidder‟s book-to-market is measured by the bidder‟s net 
book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‟s relative 
size is the ratio between the deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for 
diversifying deals take the value of 1 when the acquirer‟s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, 
and 0 otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high 
activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics 
from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorized as an active period if the number of deals is 
more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‟s lagged 
excess return for 180 days prior to the bid‟s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for 
the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 
„a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets. 
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Table 6.  Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and 
Interaction of Both with Multiple Acquirers’ Proxy. 
 
Panel A: Market valuation 
 All Bidders High Neutral Low 
Differential High- 
Low 
CARs (-2,+2) 
1.44
a 
1.85
a 
1.67
a 
0.54
c 
1.31
a 
N 3099 972 1410 717 [0.002] 
Panel B: Managerial Overconfidence 
 All Bidders Non-Overconfident Overconfident Differential 
CARs (-2,+2) 1.44
a 
1.65
a 
0.88
a 
0.77
a 
N 
3099 2256 843 [0.005] 
Panel C: Interaction between Market Valuation & Overconfidence 
                                                                              Managerial Overconfidence 
 
 
Market Valuation (4) Non-Overconfident (5) Overconfident 
(4)-(5) 
[p-value] 
(1) High  
2.16
a 
1.22
a 
0.94
c 
N 640 294 [0.057] 
    
(2) Neutral 1.79
a 
0.92
a 
0.88
b 
N 1105 378 [0.028] 
    
(3) Low  0.69
c 
0.19 0.50 
N 511 171 [0.401] 
    
(1)-(3) 1.47
a 
1.03
c 
1.97
a 
[p-value] [0.008] [0.059] [0.001] 
 
Note: This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the 
announcement by stock market valuation conditions, managerial overconfidence, and their interaction. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In panel A, using monthly data, 
each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of 
that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The 
number of bids for each category is reported below the mean return. In Panel B CEOs that make five or more 
acquisitions within a 3-year period are classified as overconfident managers. All others are classified as non-
overconfident. Panel C reports the CARs for the interaction of market valuation and managerial overconfidence. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by „a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) 
represent the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- 
minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in 
right bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- 
non-overconfident bidders minus low- overconfident bidders. N denotes the number of observations. P-values 
are reported in brackets. 
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Table 7. Cross-Sectional Analysis with Multiple Acquirers’ Proxy. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept 0.005c 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
     
High valuation period deals 0.005 
(0.003) 
   
     
Low valuation period deals -0.002 
(0.004) 
   
     
Overconfident deals 
 
 
-0.006b 
(0.003) 
  
     
High Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals 
 
  
0.007c 
(0.004) 
 
     
     
High Valuation- Overconfident Deals 
  
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
Low Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals 
 
 
  
-0.001 
(0.005) 
 
     
Low Valuation- Overconfident Deals  
 
  
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
     
Private target deals 
 
0.026a 
(0.008) 
0.027a 
(0.008) 
0.027a 
(0.008) 
0.026a 
(0.008) 
     
Cash deals 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
     
Common stock deals 
 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
     
Diversifying deals 
 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
     
B/M 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
     
Relative size 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
     
Log (MV) 
-0.011b 
(0.005) 
-0.011b 
(0.005) 
-0.011b 
(0.005) 
-0.011b 
(0.005) 
     
Rm (-180,-3) 
0.045b 
(0.019) 
0.060a 
(0.016) 
0.046b 
(0.019) 
0.056a 
(0.017) 
     
Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 
0.006a 
(0.004) 
0.005a 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
     
High Merger Activity 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
     
N 2916 2916 2916 2916 
     
F-Statistics 6.07a 6.69a 5.44a 6.82a 
     
Adj. R² 5.51% 5.53% 5.59% 5.46% 
35 
 
 
Note: This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‟s five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial overconfidence effects and 
other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids 
announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-
valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this 
period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) 
half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a manager conducts five or more acquisitions within a 3-year period and 0 
otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; 
cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 
otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 
100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before 
the deal‟s announcement. Bidder‟s book-to-market is measured by the bidder‟s net book value of assets divided 
by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‟s relative size is the ratio between the 
deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 
when the acquirer‟s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero 
otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics 
Office. Each quarter is categorised as an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and 
passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‟s lagged excess return for 180 days 
prior to the bid‟s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period 
prior to the announcement. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by „a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, 
respectively. N denotes the number of observations. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
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Table 8.  Long Run Returns (BHARs and CTARs) by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and 
Interaction of Both with Stock Options Proxy. 
 
 Panel A: 36-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
 Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Market Valuation (5) All (6) Non-Overconfident (7) Overconfident 
(6)-(7) 
[p-value] 
(1) All -4.23 2.98 -21.75
b 
24.73
c 
N 785 556 229 [0.066] 
     
(2) High  -18.03 -17.16 -20.09 2.92 
N 229 161 68 [0.919] 
     
(3) Neutral 1.40 17.92
b 
-38.23
b 
56.15
a 
N 374 264 110 [0.004] 
     
(4) Low  1.55 -2.36 11.58 -13.94 
N 182 131 51 [0.525] 
     
(2)-(4) -19.58 -14.81 -31.67  
[p-value] [0.292] [0.535] [0.247]  
 Panel B: 36-month Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTARs) 
 Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Market Valuation (5) All (6) Non-Overconfident (7) Overconfident 
(6)-(7) 
[p-value] 
(1) All -0.12 0.01 -0.48
c 
0.48 
N 785 556 229  [0.143] 
     
(2) High  -0.49 -0.38 -0.53 0.15 
N 229 161 68  [0.798] 
     
(3) Neutral -0.05 0.13 -0.46 0.59 
N 374 264 110  [0.118] 
     
(4) Low  0.10 0.10 -0.44 0.54 
N 182 131 51  [0.371] 
     
(2)-(4) -0.59 -0.48 -0.09  
[p-value] [0.169] [0.357] [0.897]  
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Note: This table presents bidder Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns (Panel A) and Calendar Abnormal Returns (Panel 
B) for the 36-month post-acquisition period by stock market valuation conditions, managerial overconfidence, 
and their interaction. We calculate the abnormal return as the acquiring firm‟s BHAR less the BHAR of a 
control firm over the three years following the acquisition announcement:  
                               
 
   
 
   
 
where Rit is the monthly return for firm i, and Rcit is the monthly return of the control firm assigned to sample 
firm i. We match a sample firm to a control firm of similar size and book-to-market ratio. The matching 
procedure is as follows. First, we identify all firms with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of the 
market value of equity of the sample firm. Second, from this set of firms, we select the firm with a book-to-
market ratio which is closest to that of the sample firm. To calculate statistical significance, we adopt a 
skewness-adjusted t-statistics. We estimate the Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTARs) as follows: CTARi,t 
= Rit − Rcpi,t where Rit is the monthly return for each security, and Rcpi,t is the return of the event control 
portfolio assigned to each sample firm based on size and book-to-market ratio. In each calendar month t, a 
portfolio is formed by including all stocks with an acquisition event during the past 36 months. Every month the 
portfolio is rebalanced by including new event firms that made a deal in the previous month and disregard those 
that have completed three years in the calendar approach. For each calendar month t we calculate a mean return 
________
( )tCTAR  across the firms: 
________
,
1
1t
N
t i t
i t
CTAR CTAR
N
 where tN  is the number of firms in the calendar-time 
month t. We then calculate a grand mean monthly abnormal return, the (MCTAR): 
_______
1
(1/ )
T
t
t
MCTAR T CTAR

  where T is the total number of calendar months. Statistical significance is 
calculated by using the time-series standard deviation of the mean monthly abnormal returns. All acquirers are 
publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified 
through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the 
top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The number of bids for each 
category is reported below the mean return. Managers who hold stock options until the year before the 
expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as non-overconfident. Significance levels 
at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by „a‟, „b‟ and „c‟, respectively. The (2)-(4) and (6)-(7) represent the 
differences in 36-month mean BHAR and CTARs of high- minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident 
minus overconfident bidders, respectively. N denotes the number of firms. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
 
